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THE INTRATEXTUAL INDEPENDENT 
“LEGISLATURE” AND THE ELECTIONS 
CLAUSE 
 
Michael T. Morley* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution is the Swiss army knife 
of federal election law. Ensconced in Article I, it provides, “The Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, 
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.”1 Its 
Article II analogue, the Presidential Electors Clause, similarly specifies that 
“[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct, a Number of Electors” to select the President.2 The concise language 
of these clauses performs a surprisingly wide range of functions implicating 
numerous doctrines and fields beyond voting rights, including statutory 
interpretation,3 state separation of powers and other issues of state 
constitutional law,4 federal court deference to state-court rulings,5 
administrative discretion,6 and preemption.7 
 
*
  Assistant Professor, Barry University School of Law. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, 
Harvard Law School, 2012–14; J.D., Yale Law School, 2003; A.B., Princeton University, 2000. Special 
thanks to Dr. Ryan Greenwood of the University of Minnesota Law Library, as well as Louis Rosen of 
the Barry Law School library, for their invaluable assistance in locating historical sources. I also am 
grateful to Terri Day, Dean Leticia Diaz, Frederick B. Jonassen, Derek Muller, Eang Ngov, Richard Re, 
Seth Tillman, and Franita Tolson for their comments and suggestions. I was invited to present some of 
the arguments from this Article in an amicus brief on behalf of the Coolidge-Reagan Foundation in 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, No. 14-1314 (U.S. 2014). I 
appreciate the superb editing of the Northwestern University Law Review Online staff. 
1  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added) [http://perma.cc/X4NH-5MDG]. 
2  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
3  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (concluding that, because 
the Constitution delegates plenary authority over presidential elections to state legislatures, “the text of 
[an] election law itself . . . takes on independent significance”) [http://perma.cc/UAF3-HBQJ]; id. at 130 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“The issue is whether . . . the law as declared by the [state] court [is] different 
from the provisions made by the [state] legislature, to which the National Constitution commits 
responsibility for determining how each State’s Presidential electors are chosen[.]”). 
4  See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892) (holding that the Elections Clause 
“operate[s] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative 
power” to regulate federal elections, including through “any provision in the state constitution in that 
regard”) [http://perma.cc/KQ4D-FQ79]; cf. Bush, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist C.J., concurring) 
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 States lack inherent power to regulate federal elections. Thus, when a 
state regulates federal elections, it is  acting “by virtue of a direct grant 
of authority” under the Elections Clause or Presidential Electors Clause.8 
These constitutional provisions are “express delegations of power”9 that 
confer upon state legislatures the power to “provide a complete code” for 
federal elections, including but not limited to laws concerning “notices, 
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud 
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and 
canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.”10 
 At first blush, the meaning of the term “legislature” in the Elections 
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause appears quite clear: it refers to the 
entity within each state comprised of elected representatives that enacts 
statutes. The Supreme Court, however, has taken a somewhat different 
view. In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, the Court held that the Elections 
Clause allows a state’s citizens to use the referendum process established by 
the state constitution to nullify a law enacted by the legislature concerning 
federal redistricting.11 It tersely rejected the argument that the state 
legislature had exclusive power under the Elections Clause to enact or 
repeal laws governing federal elections, dismissing it as “plainly without 
substance.”12 Hildebrant permits a state to enact laws governing federal 
 
(recognizing that the Presidential Electors Clause is among the “few exceptional cases in which the 
Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a State’s government”). 
5  Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (“As a general rule, this Court 
defers to a state court’s interpretation of a state statute. But in the case of a [state] 
law . . . applicable . . . to the selection of Presidential electors, the legislature is . . . acting . . . by virtue 
of a direct grant of authority made under [the Presidential Electors Clause] of the United States 
Constitution.”) [http://perma.cc/HWD8-KFF2]. 
6  See Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Brunner, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 & n.2 (S.D. Ohio 2008) 
(holding that a directive from the Ohio Secretary of State concerning minor party candidates was 
unconstitutional, because it “purport[ed] to create new law” and, under the Elections Clause, “the 
Secretary of State, a member of the executive branch of government, has no authority independent of the 
Ohio General Assembly to direct the method of the appointment of . . . federal officials”) 
[http://perma.cc/R8YE-YLP2]. 
7  Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253–54 (2013) (holding that 
federal laws passed under the Elections Clause are not subject to the traditional presumption against 
preemption) [http://perma.cc/Q6EV-K3Q7]. 
8  Palm Beach, 531 U.S. at 76; accord Cook v.  Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (“[T]he States 
may regulate the incidents of [congressional] elections . . . only within the exclusive delegation of power 
under the Elections Clause.”) [http://perma.cc/L2DT-GAB5]. 
9  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) [http://perma.cc/2KAM-M5C6]. 
10  Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) [http://perma.cc/C3VG-FKD6]. For a compelling 
discussion of the debates in the Constitutional Convention concerning the Elections Clause, as well as 
the Supreme Court’s history of interpreting it, see Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism 
as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1220–33 (2012) 
[http://perma.cc/69QM-6EBX]. 
11  241 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1916) [http://perma.cc/4ANE-KR4G]. 
12  Id. at 569. 
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elections through any process that the state constitution includes within the 
state’s “legislative power,” even if the state legislature itself is not 
involved.13 
 The Supreme Court explored the issue in greater depth in Smiley v. 
Holm, in which it permitted a state governor to veto a federal redistricting 
bill passed by the state legislature, because the state constitution included 
vetoes as part of the legislative process.14 It explained that a legislature’s 
exercise of its power under the Elections Clause to enact laws governing 
congressional elections “must be in accordance with the method which the 
State has prescribed for legislative enactments.”15 The Court added, “We 
find no suggestion in the [Elections Clause] of an attempt to endow the 
legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner other than 
that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be 
enacted.”16 
 The scope of the Elections Clause is again before the Supreme Court in 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission.17 Arizona voters passed a state constitutional amendment 
through the initiative process to “remove[] congressional redistricting 
authority from the Legislature and vest[] that authority in a new entity, the 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (“IRC”).”18 A three-judge 
panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IRC’s 
constitutionality because “Hildebrant and Smiley . . . demonstrate that the 
word ‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause refers to the legislative process 
used in [a] state, determined by that state’s own constitution and laws,”19 
rather than the institutional legislature itself. The Elections Clause therefore 
“does not prohibit a state from vesting the power to conduct congressional 
districting” in an entity other than the state legislature, such as Arizona’s 
redistricting commission.20 
 Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission is poised to be the 
Supreme Court’s first holding about whether a state’s institutional 
legislative body may be wholly stripped of its powers concerning federal 
redistricting, if not federal elections altogether.21 The immediate effects of 
 
13  Id. at 568–69. 
14  285 U.S. 355, 368 (1932). 
15  Id. at 367. 
16  Id. at 367–68. 
17  997 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Ariz. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) [http://perma.cc/X7S3-
TX6E]. 
18  Id. at 1048. 
19  Id. at 1054. 
20  Id. at 1056. 
21  The Court already has stated in dicta that a state may permit entities other than the legislature 
itself to redraw congressional districts. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (“[R]eapportionment is 
primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a 
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its ruling will reverberate far beyond Arizona, as “12 states . . . give first 
and final authority for legislative redistricting to a group other than the 
legislature.”22 More broadly, this case will revisit the meaning of the term 
legislature as used in the Elections Clause (and, by extension, Article II’s 
Presidential Electors Clause), confirming whether it actually refers to: the 
legislature alone; the legislature plus whatever other processes or entities a 
State constitution includes within the lawmaking process; or any process or 
entity that a state constitution vests with legislative power over federal 
elections, to the potential exclusion of the institutional legislature. 
 This Article contends that the term legislature should be interpreted in 
accordance with its plain meaning, as referring solely and exclusively to the 
multimember body of representatives within each state generally 
responsible for enacting its laws.23 This conclusion becomes especially clear 
through an intratextual approach to the Elections Clause. 
 Part I of this Article introduces the intratextual method of constitutional 
interpretation, explaining how the Constitution’s repeated uses of a term 
often provide a wealth of context from which a court may discern the term’s 
meaning. Part II offers an intratextual interpretation of the Elections Clause, 
examining how each of the other contexts in which the Constitution uses 
the term legislature demonstrates that the term refers to a specific 
institution. In fact, the Supreme Court itself employed an intratextual 
analysis in Hawke v. Smith to conclude that Article V permits a state to 
ratify a constitutional amendment only through a vote of its institutional 
legislature (or a specially called convention), not a public referendum.24 
 Part III shows that this understanding is confirmed by both a traditional 
textualist approach to the term, as well as the “independent state legislature” 
 
federal court.”) [http://perma.cc/LE5R-JZVE]; accord Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) 
[http://perma.cc/2WJ9-M4B6]. 
22  Redistricting Commissions and Alternatives to the Legislature Conducting Redistricting, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-commissions.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/R298-YKDT]. 
23  Much academic debate on this issue has focused on whether the Presidential Electors Clause 
allows a state’s citizens to change the state’s method for allocating presidential electors from winner-
take-all to a proportional system through a public initiative. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Direct 
Democracy and Article II: Additional Thoughts on Initiatives and Presidential Elections, 35 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 631 (2008) (defending the use of ballot initiatives to change state laws governing 
presidential elections) [http://perma.cc/AGV4-WPTD]; Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” May 
Mean More Than “Legislature”: Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 
35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 629 (2008) (“A strict textual view suggests that initiated reform is 
unconstitutional; case law and policy arguments show the question is more uncertain. Reasonable judges 
could reach opposite conclusions on the question.”) [http://perma.cc/ZYN5-5QB5]; Nicholas P. Stabile, 
Comment, An End Run Around a Representative Democracy? The Unconstitutionality of a Ballot 
Initiative to Alter the Method of Distributing Electors, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2009) 
[http://perma.cc/Y69V-Z5ZW]. 
24  253 U.S. 221, 227–28 (1920) [http://perma.cc/ZEA8-VMKY]. 
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doctrine.25 Part IV briefly concludes that adopting an intratextual approach 
to the term legislature—one informed by both traditional textualism and the 
independent state legislature doctrine—would help the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission Court reach the most accurate understanding of 
the Elections Clause. 
I. IN DEFENSE OF AN INTRATEXTUAL APPROACH 
 Intratextualism counsels that the Constitution’s use of “strongly parallel 
language [in different places] is a strong (presumptive) argument for 
parallel interpretation” of that language.26 This approach urges a reader 
interpreting “a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution” to 
consider its meaning as it appears in other passages.27 “[T]extually 
nonadjoining clauses” of the Constitution should be placed “side by side for 
careful analysis,” to ensure that a proposed interpretation of a term makes 
sense in the various contexts in which the Constitution deploys it.28 
 Akhil Amar identifies three main types of intratextual arguments. First, 
when attempting to determine the meaning of a word in a particular clause, 
other constitutional provisions can “serve[] a basic dictionary function” by 
“illustrat[ing] [its] usage.”29 Second, a reader also may arrive at the “best” 
interpretation of a term by determining the meaning that would fit best with 
its usage throughout the Constitution.30 Finally, when entire clauses are 
structured identically to each other, with only one or two key words 
changed, they generally should be read in pari materia and interpreted 
consistently.31 
 Amar contends that the “greatest virtue of intratextualism” is that “it 
takes seriously the document as a whole rather than as a jumbled grab bag 
of assorted clauses.”32 He explores the Court’s long legacy of intratextual 
analysis,33 including Chief Justice John Marshall’s use of intratextualism in 
McCulloch v. Maryland34 and Justice Joseph Story’s use of it in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee.35 As mentioned earlier, in Hawke v. Smith, the Court 
 
25  The independent state legislature doctrine provides that a state legislature is not bound by 
substantive restrictions or limits contained in a state constitution when exercising its power under the 
Elections Clause or Presidential Electors Clause to regulate federal elections. See infra Section III.B. 
26  Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789 (1999) [http://perma.cc/2Q9Q-
KV7N]. 
27  Id. at 748. 
28  Id. at 788. 
29  Id. at 791. 
30  Id. at 792–94. 
31  Id. at 794–95. 
32  Id. at 795. 
33  Id. at 755–58, 760–63. 
34  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412 (1819) [http://perma.cc/P3NJ-8F8F]. 
35  14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328–34 (1816) [http://perma.cc/L9NH-36Y2]. For a more recent 
example, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008), in which the Court interpreted 
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adopted an intratextual approach to determine the meaning of the term 
legislature as it appears in Article V.36 Academic commentators have also 
applied this technique to various constitutional provisions.37 
 Intratextual interpretation is not a mechanical process, however, as 
“certain chameleon words should sensibly mean different things in different 
clauses.”38 When the Constitution uses a word differently in different 
contexts, intratextualism can lead to misleading results.39 Moreover, 
“[c]arried to extremes, intratextualism may lead to readings that are too 
clever by half—cabalistic overreadings conjuring up patterns that were not 
specifically intended and that are upon deep reflection not truly sound.”40 
Thus, intratextualism should be used to “suggest possible readings” or 
“generate interpretative leads and clues” that must be assessed through 
“other tools of interpretation,” not to “dictate results.”41 
 Adrian Vermeule and Ernest A. Young offer a powerful critique of 
intratextualism, questioning its premise that the Constitution should be 
given a consistent, uniform interpretation. They point out that the document 
may lack internal consistency because its “component provisions were 
enacted at different times, in different circumstances, and for different 
reasons.”42 Even the text of the original, unamended Constitution is the 
result of numerous “tradeoffs, political battles won and lost, and 
compromised ideals.”43 Rather than an integrated document springing from 
a single author, it is the product of a body of people disagreeing, 
 
the phrase “right of the people” as used in the Second Amendment to protect an individual right to bear 
arms, because the Constitution’s three other uses of that phrase “unambiguously refer to individual 
rights.” [http://perma.cc/TXE2-XUWV]. 
36  253 U.S. 221, 227–28 (1920). 
37  E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the 
Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1021–22 (2007) 
(applying intratextualism to interpret the words “inferior” and “supreme” with regard to courts); 
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 725 (2008) (same for the word “treaties”) [http://perma.cc/4XUC-53BG]; Vasan 
Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1757–58 (2002) (same for 
congressional authority to regulate Presidential elections); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce 
Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1172 (2003) (applying 
an intratextual comparison of the Interstate, Foreign and Indian Commerce Clauses). For articles where 
intratextualism was deemed insufficient to support a particular interpretation, see Calvin Massey, 
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 493–94 (2002) [http://perma.cc/63S8-
R53Z] and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 39 (2013) 
[http://perma.cc/S6KT-ZQ8Q]. 
38  Amar, supra note 26, at 793; accord id. at 799. 
39  E.g., Adrian Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1175, 1181 
(2003); Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with 
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 767–68 (2000) [http://perma.cc/BF6C-CSSB]. 
40  Amar, supra note 26, at 799. 
41  Id. 
42  Vermeule & Young, supra note 39, at 731; accord Clark, supra note 37, at 723. 
43  Vermeule & Young, supra note 39, at 742.  
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compromising, and amending each other’s work. It is highly unlikely that 
the dozens of men who contributed to its writing all used important terms 
consistently.44 
 Moreover, because intratextualism requires judges to interpret a term as 
it appears in numerous constitutional provisions, this approach may unduly 
tax their “time, information, and expertise;” lead to more errors; and allow 
for more subjectivity than a clause-bound method of interpretation.45 
Intratextualism also is more indeterminate and manipulable than clause-
bound textualism, because it does not offer interpretive guidance when a 
term’s apparent meaning based on a single clause in isolation differs from 
its apparent meaning based on other clauses in which it appears. Thus, a 
reader still must choose among competing interpretations using a theory or 
process other than intratextualism itself.46 William Treanor, further 
critiquing intratextualism from an originalist perspective, adds that it is 
“unreliable” because it “privileges a small subset of contemporaneous 
usages (those in the constitutional document) over the larger body of 
relevant contemporaneous usages.”47 
 At a minimum, intratextualism provides a useful data point for courts to 
consider in determining the meaning of a disputed term, and would be 
especially useful for the Supreme Court in interpreting the meaning of 
legislature in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The 
term is concrete and reasonably susceptible of a limited number of 
definitions. Moreover, it does not appear to lend itself to the type of 
compromise or mutually inconsistent understandings to which other, more 
general language might be subject. 
 Additionally, the original, unamended Constitution uses legislature on 
numerous different occasions, thereby avoiding the issue of whether 
subsequent constitutional amendments employ it in the same manner. As 
Part II demonstrates, the numerous other constitutional clauses that use the 
term all refer to a state’s sole lawmaking body comprised of elected 
representatives, rather than some broader conception of the word. This 
consistent pattern of usage creates a strong presumption that the Elections 
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause employ it in the same fashion. And, 
 
44  See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610 (1842) (pointing out that, because many 
constitutional provisions “were matters of compromise of opposing interests and opinions . . . no 
uniform rule of interpretation can be applied to it”) [http://perma.cc/JMF4-DN67]. 
45  Vermeuele & Young, supra note 39, at 731; accord Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 941 (2003). 
46  Michael J. Gerhardt, The Utility and Significance of Professor Amar’s Holistic Reasoning, 
87 Geo. L.J. 2327, 2330 (1999) (book review) (concluding that intratextualism “provides an almost 
limitless array of possible interpretations or readings and posits no standard for measuring or choosing 
among plausible interpretations”). 
47  William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, 
and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 523–24 (2007) [http://perma.cc/QV2Z-
8U8T]. 
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as discussed in Part III, the results of this intratextual analysis can be 
corroborated through both a plain meaning interpretation as well as 
consideration of the longstanding independent state legislature doctrine. 
Even if the constraints under which many judges operate may prevent them 
from using intratextualism effectively, the Supreme Court can devote 
sufficient time and attention to a case of this magnitude to make 
intratextualism an appropriate and useful strategy. 
II. INTRATEXTUALISM AND THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE 
 The Constitution contains numerous references to state legislatures that 
may be used to elucidate that term’s meaning as it appears in the Elections 
Clause (and, by extension, the Presidential Electors Clause). These 
references may be divided into four groups: (i) those that discuss features of 
a legislature; (ii) those that distinguish between a state legislature and other 
state personnel or entities; (iii) those that confer quasi-legislative or 
nonlegislative powers upon a legislature; and (iv) those, such as the 
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, that confer legislative 
authority over certain subjects upon the legislature. 
 The text, context, original understanding, and consistent history of 
interpretation of the first three types of references to the term legislature 
demonstrate that it is best understood as referring to a state’s general 
lawmaking body of elected representatives, rather than a broader legislative 
power48 or other entities upon which a state’s constitution may attempt to 
confer a portion of that legislative power. These provisions create a strong, 
and ultimately insurmountable, presumption that the same meaning should 
be attributed to the term as it appears in the fourth category of clauses: those 
such as the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause that grant 
state legislatures the power to enact certain types of laws. 
A. Discussions of Legislatures 
Certain constitutional provisions’ usage of the term legislature reveals 
that a legislature contains certain characteristics. For example, Article VI’s 
Oath Clause requires that “Members of the several State Legislatures . . . be 
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support th[e] Constitution.”49 This 
provision contemplates that a state legislature will have members. And its 
requirement that such members pledge to uphold the federal Constitution is 
best understood as referring to individuals who belong to a particular 
lawmaking institution within a state, rather than members of some 
 
48  Cf. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568–69 (1916). 
49  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. The Fourteenth Amendment contains similar references.  Section 2 
imposes penalties on a State that denies the right to vote, including in elections for “members of the 
legislature.”  Id. amend. XIV, § 2.  Section 3 prohibits a person who, while “a member of any state 
legislature,” engaged in “insurrection or rebellion” against the United States from serving as a federal 
official unless Congress removes the disability by a two-thirds vote.  Id. amend. XIV, § 3. 
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overarching legislative power that conceivably encompasses the entire 
voting public. 
Similarly, Article I’s Qualifications Clause provides that a person may 
vote for the U.S. House of Representatives if he possesses “the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the 
State Legislature.”50 This provision treats the legislature as an entity that 
presumptively features multiple branches and is comprised of 
representatives selected by electors. 
Article I’s Senate Vacancies Clause (which has been superseded by the 
Seventeenth Amendment) states that, if a vacancy occurs in the U.S. Senate 
“during the Recess of the Legislature of any State,” the state executive may 
make a temporary appointment “until the next Meeting of the 
Legislature.”51 Yet again, this provision contemplates the existence of an 
institutional legislature whose members periodically meet and which may 
be called into recess. Finally, the Domestic Violence Clause in Article IV 
provides that, “on Application of the [state] Legislature, or of the [state] 
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened),” the federal 
government shall protect a state against “domestic Violence.”52 This further 
corroborates the constitutional image of a legislature as a multimember 
body that periodically convenes and adjourns. 
Thus, every clause that gives some insight into the nature of the 
legislature uses the term to refer to a particular institution within each state 
that contains members, is presumptively comprised of multiple branches, 
periodically convenes and meets for limited periods of time, and then enters 
into recess. 
B. Provisions That Distinguish Between Legislatures and Other State 
Personnel and Entities 
Several other constitutional provisions expressly distinguish between 
legislatures (and their members) and other state officials and entities. For 
example, as discussed above, the Oath Clause requires “Members of the 
several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of the 
several States” to take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.53 
Likewise, the Senate Vacancies Clause provides that, if a vacancy occurs 
while the “Legislature of any State” is in recess, “the Executive thereof may 
make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, 
 
50  Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The Seventeenth Amendment contains identical language concerning U.S. 
Senate elections. Id. amend. XVII. 
51  Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. 
52  Id. art. IV, § 4. 
53  Id. art. VI, cl. 3. Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment discussed above reprise this list of 
State officials. See supra note 49. 
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which shall then fill such Vacancies.”54 And the Domestic Violence Clause 
requires the federal government to protect a state “against domestic 
Violence” upon “Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when 
the Legislature cannot be convened).”55 These provisions all distinguish 
between the state legislature and the state executive (or state executive 
officials). This juxtaposition of different branches suggests that, just as 
references to a state’s executive are best construed as referring to its 
governor, references to a state’s legislature are best construed as referring to 
its main lawmaking body comprised of elected representatives. 
Even more telling is Article V, which specifies that a proposed 
constitutional amendment may be ratified either by “the Legislatures” or 
“Conventions” in three-fourths of the States, depending on the mode of 
ratification authorized by Congress.56 This clause demonstrates that, when 
the Framers wished to authorize action by the people independent of their 
institutional legislatures, they knew how to do so. Article V further bolsters 
the conclusion that the term legislature refers exclusively to the particular 
institution within a state that exercises its general lawmaking authority. 
C. References to Quasi-Legislative or Nonlegislative Powers 
Numerous constitutional provisions confer authority on state 
legislatures other than the power to enact certain types of laws. The 
Constitution grants them the power to choose U.S. Senators (since repealed 
by the Seventeenth Amendment);57 “fill” Senate vacancies;58 “call” for a 
convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution;59 “[a]ppl[y]” for 
the federal government’s “protect[ion] . . . against domestic Violence;”60 
“ratif[y]” proposed amendments to the Constitution;61 and “[c]onsent” to the 
formation of new states within their borders or through “Junction” with 
other states,62 or to the federal government’s purchase and exercise of 
exclusive authority over land within the state for the erection of military 
facilities, docks, and other “needful Buildings.”63 
 
54  Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. The Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy provisions likewise distinguish 
between the state legislature and the state’s “executive authority.” Id. amend. XVII. 
55  Id. art. IV, § 4. 
56  Id. art. V. 
57  Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
58  Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2; cf. id. amend. XVII, § 2. 
59  Id. art. V. 
60  Id. art. IV, § 4. 
61  Id. art. V. Consistent with this provision, various constitutional amendments specify that they 
would not take effect unless ratified by a sufficient number of state “legislatures” within a specified 
period of time. Id. amend. XVIII, § 3; id. amend. XX, § 6; id. amend. XXII, § 2. 
62  Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
63  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
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 For most, if not all, of these provisions, the Framers’ debates over the 
Constitution further confirm that they exclusively empower institutional 
legislatures to perform the specified acts. For example, as originally 
enacted, the Constitution directed state legislatures, rather than the 
electorate, to choose U.S. senators.64 During the Constitutional Convention, 
James Dickenson moved that senators be elected by state legislature for two 
reasons: 
 
1. because the sense of the States would be better collected through their 
Governments; than immediately from the people at large. 2. because he wished 
the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters . . . and he thought 
such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any 
other mode.65 
 
He later added that granting legislatures this power would help preserve the 
states as distinct entities and “produce that collision” between the federal 
and state governments “which should be wished for in order to check each 
other.”66 
 Throughout the ensuing debate, all delegates used the term legislature 
consistently, referring to a particular, well-understood entity within each 
state.67 Later in the convention, James Wilson reiterated: 
 
[O]ne branch of the Genl.—Govt. (the Senate or second branch) was to be 
appointed by the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this 
participation in the Genl. Govt. would have an opportunity of defending their 
 
64  Id. art. I, §  3, cl. 1 (amended 1913). This provision’s reference to legislatures was specifically 
intended to preclude the electorate from playing a direct role in electing U.S. Senators. See U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 884 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In the context of 
congressional elections, the Framers obviously saw a meaningful difference between direct action by the 
people of each State and action by their state legislatures.”); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION § 701, at 182 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (observing that the Framers 
unanimously voted for the Senate to be “chosen by the legislature of each state” rather than “by the 
people thereof”) [http://perma.cc/76MR-E2JF]; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 323 (James 
Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (distinguishing, in its discussion of the U.S. Senate, between “the State 
legislatures” and “the people at large”) [http://perma.cc/8JR2-UQCH].  
65  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 150 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 7, 1787) (statement of John Dickinson) 
[http://perma.cc/RE8P-VJHP]. 
66  Id. at 153 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 7, 1787) (statement of John Dickinson). 
67  For example, Roger Sherman concurred, urging that “elections by the people” are not as likely “to 
produce such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.” Id. at 154 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 7, 1787) 
(statement of Roger Sherman). Elbridge Gerry similarly contended that allowing the People to select 
Senators directly would give the “landed interest” an advantage and leave commercial interests with “no 
security.” Id. at 152 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 7, 1787) (statement of Elbridge Gerry). Conferring that 
power on state legislatures, in contrast, would “be most likely to provide some check in favor of the 
commercial interest [against] the landed; without which oppression will take place.” Id. 
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rights. . . . The States having in general a similar interest, in case of any 
proposition in the National Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, 
he conceived a general alarm [would] take place in the National Legislature 
itself, that it would communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and [would] 
finally spread among the people at large.68 
 
Thus, in commenting on the selection of senators, Wilson expressly 
distinguished among a “State” as a whole, state legislatures, and “the people 
at large.”69 
 Likewise, in discussing the Senate Vacancies Clause, the Framers’ 
debates unmistakably concerned institutional legislatures: they discussed 
the relative frequency with which various states’ legislatures met and the 
power of certain legislatures to select the state’s governor.70 The same is 
true of Article V’s delegation of authority to state legislatures to call for a 
new constitutional convention and to ratify amendments to the 
Constitution.71 As the Supreme Court recognized in Hawke v. Smith, 
legislature was “not a term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the 
Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for the purpose of 
interpretation. A legislature was then the representative body which made 
the laws of the people.”72 The debates at the Constitutional Convention 
likewise confirm that the power to request federal assistance under the 
Domestic Violence Clause lies specifically in the institutional legislature.73 
D.  References to Legislative Authority 
The plain text of the Constitution, context of other constitutional 
provisions, and Framers’ original understanding all confirm that the 
Constitution’s numerous other instances of the term legislature uniformly 
refer to the specific institution within each state that is comprised of elected 
representatives and exercises general lawmaking authority. Compelling 
evidence is therefore necessary to conclude that the term has a different, 
unique, and unusual meaning as used in the Elections Clause and 
Presidential Electors Clause. 
 
68  Id. at 355–56 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 7, 1787) (statement of James Wilson); accord id. at 366 
(King’s notes, Jun. 21, 1787) (statement of James Wilson). 
69  Id. at 355–56 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 7, 1787) (statement of James Wilson). 
70  2 id. at 231 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 9, 1787) (statement of James Wilson). 
71  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
72  253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). The Court elaborated, “When [the Framers] intended that direct action 
by the people should be had they were no less accurate in the use of apt phraseology to carry out such 
purpose.” Id. at 228; see also Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (“The referendum 
provisions of state constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of the 
United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it.”) [http://perma.cc/QA5S-ZHT6]. 
73  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 65, at 316–17, 466–67 (Madison’s Notes Aug. 17, 1787, 
Aug. 30, 1787). 
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The Supreme Court previously held that the term legislature should be 
accorded a different meaning in the Elections Clause (and, by extension, the 
Presidential Electors Clause) because those provisions—unlike the 
Constitution’s other references to legislatures—confer a type of 
traditionally legislative authority on state legislatures: the ability to enact 
laws regulating federal elections.74 The Court never explained, however, 
why this somewhat different context requires a unique definition of 
legislature that differs from its use throughout the rest of the Constitution. 
In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, the Court held that the Elections 
Clause permitted Congress to enact a law authorizing states to draw or alter 
congressional districts through either state legislation or public referenda.75 
It rejected as “plainly without substance” a challenge to a state referendum 
that nullified a redistricting plan enacted by the Ohio legislature.76 Despite 
the Court’s single passing reference to the Elections Clause, however, it 
assumed that any constitutional challenge to the use of public referenda to 
regulate federal elections must arise under the Guarantee Clause.77 
According to the Court, the Petitioners were arguing that public 
referenda “introduce a virus” that “annihilates representative government 
and causes a State . . . to be not republican in form.”78 It summarily rejected 
that argument on the grounds that Guarantee Clause claims are 
nonjusticiable.79 Thus, while Hildebrant mentioned the Elections Clause, it 
neither held nor purported to explain why the electorate or a public 
referendum qualifies as a legislature under the Elections Clause. Rather, the 
Hildebrant Court failed to recognize that a distinct Elections Clause claim 
existed, and instead transmuted the plaintiff’s claim under that provision 
into a nonjusticiable Guarantee Clause argument. 
In Hawke v. Smith, the Court held that the term legislature in the 
Article V Amendment Clause exclusively refers to “the representative body 
which ma[kes] the laws of the people.”80 The Court distinguished 
Hildebrant by contending that the case held the Elections Clause “plainly 
 
74  Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932) (holding that the language of the Elections Clause 
“aptly points to the making of laws”); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 n.1 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause “call upon legislatures to 
act in a lawmaking capacity whereas [the Ratification Clause] simply calls on the legislative body to 
deliberate upon a binary decision”); see also Seth Barrett Tillman, Betwixt Principle and Practice: Tara 
Ross’s Defense of the Electoral College, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 922, 925–26 (2005) (book review) 
(contending that the term Legislature can “have a variety of meanings depending on context”). The 
Seventeenth Amendment also may be read in part as authorizing the enactment of legislation concerning 
the appointment of U.S. Senators. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
75  241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916). 
76  Id. 
77  Id. (discussing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4). 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). 
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gives authority to the State to legislate” concerning federal elections 
through public referenda.81 Congress therefore could recognize a 
“referendum as part of the legislative authority of the State” under 
constitutional provisions dealing with the enactment of laws.82 “Such 
legislative action,” the Court reasoned, “is entirely different from the 
requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a 
proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such expression no legislative 
action is authorized or required.”83 Hawke’s premise—that Hildebrant 
purported to interpret the Elections Clause—is an overstatement. As 
discussed above, Hildebrant misinterpreted or avoided the Elections Clause 
issue by transmuting it into a Guarantee Clause claim.84 In any event, 
Hawke never explained why the term legislature should be given different 
meanings under the Elections Clause and Article V (or the other 
constitutional provisions it surveyed). The Court pointed out that enacting 
statutes under the Elections Clause to regulate federal elections is a 
traditional legislative activity, while ratifying constitutional amendments 
under Article V is a quasi- or nonlegislative act.85 It never explains, 
however, why this distinction requires or justifies attributing a different and 
unusual meaning to the term legislature. In light of the Constitution’s 
consistent use of that term throughout the rest of the document, there is a 
strong presumption that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors 
Clause use it in the same manner—a presumption that neither Hildebrant 
nor Hawke overcomes. 
The Court gestured toward these issues in Smiley v. Holm, in which it 
considered whether the Elections Clause permits a state’s governor to veto a 
state law regulating federal elections that the state’s institutional legislature 
enacted.86 Smiley reiterated that, unlike most other constitutional provisions 
referring to legislatures, the Elections Clause grants them lawmaking 
authority.87 The Court held, “As the authority is conferred for the purpose of 
making laws for the State, it follows, in the absence of an indication of a 
contrary intent, that the exercise of the authority must be in accordance with 
the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.”88 
Smiley never held that the term legislature should mean something other 
than a state’s institutional, representative lawmaking body. Rather, it 
concluded only that when such an entity exercises authority under the 
 
81  Id. at 231 (emphasis added). 
82  Id. at 230. 
83  Id. at 231. 
84  See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
85  Hawke, 253 U.S. at 231. 
86  285 U.S. 355, 365–66 (1932).  
87  Id. at 367. 
88  Id. 
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Elections Clause, it must do so subject to the standard lawmaking process 
set forth in the state constitution, including a gubernatorial veto.89 
Thus, the holdings of both Hawke and Smiley are consistent with an 
intratextual reading of the term legislature as used in the Elections Clause 
and Presidential Electors Clause, and Hildebrant does not actually address 
the issue. The Supreme Court never identified any evidence that the 
Framers intended to use the term differently in those provisions than 
throughout the rest of the Constitution. Nor did it provide a persuasive 
explanation as to why the word should mean something different when 
referring to the exercise of a traditionally legislative power rather than a 
quasi- or nonlegislative power. 
The Federalist Papers confirm that the term legislature bears the same 
meaning in the Elections Clause as it does in Article I, § 3, which permitted 
state legislatures to select U.S. senators. Federalist No. 59 explains that 
state legislatures seeking to undermine the national government are more 
likely to do so by abusing their power under the Elections Clause by 
refusing to hold House elections, than by refusing to appoint Senators.90 The 
Elections Clause itself alleviates this risk by permitting Congress to impose 
its own rules for congressional elections if states fail to act.91 The early 
Commentaries of both St. George Tucker92 and Chancellor Kent93 likewise 
discuss legislatures under Article I, § 3 and under the Elections Clause—
often in the same sentence—without suggesting any potential differences in 
the term’s meaning. Kent also distinguished between having the legislature 
select presidential electors and allowing the “people at large” to do so, 
confirming that a power vested in a “legislature” may not be exercised 
directly by the electorate as a whole.94 
Thus, the best reading of the word legislature as it appears throughout 
the Constitution, including in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors 
Clause, is that it refers solely and exclusively to a state’s general lawmaking 
body comprised of elected representatives and cannot extend to other 
entities such as independent redistricting commissions. 
 
89  Id. at 372–73. 
90  THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 302–04 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
[http://perma.cc/X7NB-QWTP]. 
91  Id. at 302. 
92  1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, note D, pt. 2, at 143–44 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch, and 
Abraham Small 1803) [http://perma.cc/CP73-6ERC]. 
93  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, pt. 2, lecture XI, at 210–12 (New York, O. 
Halsted 1826) [https://perma.cc/3RA9-58BM]. 
94  Id., pt. 2, lecture XIII, at 232. 
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III. CONFIRMING THE INTRATEXTUAL CONCLUSION 
 Even compelling intratextual arguments can be further bolstered 
through outside confirmation.95 Here, an intratextual interpretation of the 
term legislature is confirmed by the original understanding of that term in 
the Founding Era, as well as the independent state legislature doctrine that 
courts applied for well over a century and a half following the 
Constitution’s enactment. 
A. Original Understanding 
 An intratextual interpretation of the term legislature is consistent with a 
clause-bound approach that focuses on how that term was generally 
understood in the Founding Era. Any such textual analysis must begin with 
dictionaries from that period.96 Matthew Hale’s 1713 The History of the 
Common Law of England defines the British legislature as comprised of 
three parts: the King of the Realm and the two Houses of Parliament.97 
Citing Hale’s work, Samuel Johnson’s mid-1700s dictionary defines 
legislature as “the power that makes laws.”98 Several other Founding Era 
dictionaries utilized Johnson’s definition verbatim.99 James Barclay’s 
dictionary both incorporates Johnson’s definition and, in its accompanying 
discussion, explains that the legislature is comprised of the House of Lords 
and the House of Commons.100 
 Entities such as the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 
would not qualify as legislatures under the prevailing definition from the 
Founding Era for at least three reasons. First, those definitions’ use of the 
definite article “the” implies the existence of a single legislature within each 
sovereign entity. They appear to preclude recognition of multiple entities 
within a state as legislatures. Second, the definitions refer to the exercise of 
a general lawmaking power. An entity specifically empowered only to enact 
certain kinds of laws or perform certain narrow functions (i.e., drawing 
congressional districts) would not qualify as a legislature. Third, drawing 
congressional districts arguably does not even qualify as “mak[ing] laws.” 
 
95  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
96  See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) [http://perma.cc/ULD5-NM5K]; 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008). 
97  MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 2 (London, J. Nutt 1713) 
[http://perma.cc/9T49-HRQB]. 
98  2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 32 (London, W. Strahan 1755) 
[https://perma.cc/9WMC-XK4J]. 
99  E.g., CALEB ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 285 
(Boston, Isaiah Thomas & Ebenezer T. Andrews 1800); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 360 (London, Charles Dilly, 2d ed. 1789). 
100  JAMES BARCLAY, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON A NEW PLAN xli–xlii, 
603 (London, J.F. and C. Rivington, 1792). 
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 Perhaps more importantly, every state constitution from the Founding 
Era that used the term legislature defined it as a distinct multimember entity 
comprised of representatives with the authority to enact laws,101 and most 
other references to legislatures throughout those documents are consistent 
with that understanding.102 If the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors 
Clause used the term legislature in a broader capacity, they would 
apparently be the only provisions in any organic documents from the 
Founding Era to do so—not a single precedent in any state constitution 
supports a more expansive interpretation. 
 The Federalist Papers and Justice Story’s Commentaries on the 
Constitution reinforce this interpretation. Federalist No. 59 and Section 814 
of Story’s Commentaries, which focus specifically on the Elections Clause, 
contend that there “were only three ways” in which the power to regulate 
federal elections could have been allotted: “it must either have been lodged 
wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures, or 
 
101  DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 2 (“The legislature shall be formed of two distinct branches; they shall 
meet once or oftener in every year, and shall be called, ‘The general assembly of Delaware.’”); GA. 
CONST. of 1777, art. II (“The legislature of this State shall be composed of the representatives of the 
people . . . and the representatives shall be elected yearly . . . .”); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. I (“THAT the 
Legislature consist of two distinct branches, a Senate and House of Delegates, which shall be styled, The 
General Assembly of Maryland.”); MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. I, § II, art. II; pt. II, ch. I, § III, art. I (“The 
Senate shall be the first branch of the legislature . . . . There [also] shall be, in the legislature of this 
commonwealth, a representation of the people, annually elected . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. II 
(“[T]he supreme legislative power within this State shall be vested in two separate and distinct bodies of 
men . . . who together shall form the legislature . . . .”); VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 2 (“The legislative 
shall be formed of two distinct branches, who, together, shall be a complete Legislature.”); see also N.H. 
CONST. of 1776, para. 4 (discussing “both branches of the legislature”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VI 
(establishing the Council as “a free and independent branch of the Legislature of this Colony”); N.C. 
CONST. of 1776, declaration XVIII (“[T]he people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their 
common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of 
grievances.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI (“[T]he people have a right to assemble together, to consult 
for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of 
grievances . . . .”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. IX (providing that the “journal shall be laid before the 
legislature when required by either house”). 
The organic documents of Connecticut and Rhode Island did not refer to a legislature. CHARTER OF 
CT. of 1662; GOVERNMENT OF NEW HAVEN COLONY of 1643; CONST. OF THE COLONY OF NEW-HAVEN 
of 1639; FUNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF CT. of 1639; R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS CHARTER of 1663. 
See generally FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR 
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1909) (collecting historical state and colony 
constitutions) [https://perma.cc/48TM-HHU6]. 
102  DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 3, 5, 12, 13, 16, 24, 25, 29; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XII, XXXV, LI, 
LIV, LV, LXII; MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, § III, art. V; id. pt. II, ch. II, § III, art. VII, superseded by 
MASS. CONST. amend. XXV; id. pt. II, ch. III, art. I–II; id. pt. II, ch. VI, art. II; id. pt. II, ch. VI, art. X, 
annulled by MASS. CONST. amend. XLVIII; MD. CONST. of 1776, declarations III, V, VII–XII, XX, 
XXVI, XXVIII, XXX, XXXIII–XXXV, XLII; id. art. II, XV, XVIII, XXVI, XLIII, LVI; N.J. CONST. of 
1776, art. XIX; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III, V, VI, XII, XV, XVIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, declaration 
XXV; id. art. XLIII; PA. CONST. of 1776, § § 9, 30-31, 33, 35, 37, 47; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. II, XII–
XXIV, XXXIV, XXXVIII. 
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primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former.”103 They explain that the 
Elections Clause embodies the final alternative.104 These passages’ contrast 
of the “national legislature,” which refers exclusively to Congress, with 
“state legislatures” strongly suggests that the latter refers to a state’s 
analogue to Congress: its institutional legislature, comprised of elected 
representatives, that exercises general lawmaking authority. 
 William Rawle’s A View of the Constitution likewise states that the 
Elections Clause permits Congress to “make or alter” regulations governing 
federal elections, “except as to the place of choosing senators,” in order to 
“guard against a refractory disposition, should it ever arise in the 
legislatures of the states,” concerning the issue.105 He explains that the 
Elections Clause’s exception concerning the place of choosing senators 
“was proper, as congress ought not to have the power of convening the state 
legislature at any other than its usual place of meeting.”106 Thus, Rawle also 
treated the entity empowered to select senators as the same one delegated 
sole constitutional authority to regulate federal elections (subject only to 
congressional override). 
B. The Independent State Legislature Doctrine 
 Finally, the independent state legislature doctrine, which has been 
embraced by the Supreme Court, state courts, and both houses of 
Congress,107 further confirms the accuracy of an intratextual interpretation 
of legislature. This doctrine recognizes that a state legislature’s authority to 
regulate federal elections comes directly from the U.S. Constitution.108 
Consequently, a state constitution may neither impose substantive limits on 
the scope of a legislature’s authority to regulate the time, place, or manner 
of federal elections, nor strip the legislature of its prerogative to do so. 
Arizona’s Independent Redistricting Commission flatly violates the 
independent state legislature doctrine because the state constitutional 
amendment that created it purports to strip the legislature, as a matter of 
state constitutional law, of authority it derives directly from the U.S. 
Constitution. 
 
103  THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 301 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); accord 2 STORY, 
supra note 64, at § 814, at 281. 
104  THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 301–02 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); 2 STORY, 
supra note 64, at § 814, at 281–82. 
105  WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 42 
(Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825). 
106  Id. 
107  See Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 189, 198–204 (2014) [http://perma.cc/ZE3Y-UVYQ]. 
108  Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (“[T]he States may regulate the incidents of [federal] 
elections . . . only within the exclusive delegation of power under the Elections Clause.”). 
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 In 1892, the Supreme Court recognized the independent state legislature 
doctrine in dicta in McPherson v. Blacker.109 It stated that the Presidential 
Electors Clause “operate[s] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any 
attempt to circumscribe the legislative power” concerning presidential 
elections, including through “any provision in the state constitution in that 
regard.”110 This reasoning applies with equal force to congressional 
elections and the Elections Clause. 
 The Court went even further in Leser v. Garnett, in which it held that 
the doctrine also applies to a state legislature’s role in ratifying 
constitutional amendments under Article V.111 It ruled that a legislature’s 
“function . . . in ratifying a proposed amendment to the Federal 
Constitution . . . is a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution; 
and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a 
State.”112 A state constitutional provision purporting to prevent the 
legislature from ratifying certain amendments to the U.S. Constitution is 
therefore unenforceable.113 
 Several state courts similarly have relied on the independent state 
legislature doctrine as an essential component of their holdings concerning 
the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. For example, the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held in In re Plurality Elections that the 
state constitution may not “impose a restraint upon the power of prescribing 
the manner of holding [federal] elections which is given to the legislature 
by the constitution of the United States without restraint.”114 The court 
enforced a state law providing that a candidate had to receive only a 
plurality of votes in order to win a federal election, despite a state 
constitutional provision specifying that all candidates had to receive an 
absolute majority to prevail.115 
Likewise, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was 
“unnecessary . . . to consider whether or not there is a conflict between the 
method of appointment of presidential electors directed by the Legislature” 
and a particular provision of the state constitution.116 It explained that a state 
constitution may not “‘circumscribe the legislative power’ granted by the 
Constitution of the United States” to regulate the selection of presidential 
electors.117 Other courts have reached the same conclusion.118 
 
109  146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
110  Id. at 25. 
111  258 U.S. 130, 135 (1922) [http://perma.cc/FG53-VQPK]. 
112  Id. at 137. 
113  Id. at 136–37. 
114  8 A. 881, 882 (R.I. 1887). 
115  Id. 
116  State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 287 (Neb. 1948). 
117  Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)). 
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 The U.S. House of Representatives adopted the independent state 
legislature doctrine in resolving an election challenge in Baldwin v. 
Trowbridge.119 The House upheld the validity of votes cast in a 
congressional election pursuant to a state law that authorized voting by 
military members who were absent from their districts on Election Day, 
despite a state constitutional provision requiring that all votes be cast in 
person.120 Similarly, in a report on the Electoral College, the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Privileges and Elections concluded that a state legislature’s 
power under the Presidential Electors Clause to regulate presidential 
elections cannot be: 
 
[T]aken from [state legislatures] or modified by their State constitutions any 
more than can their power to elect Senators of the United States. Whatever 
provisions may be made by statute, or by the State constitution, to choose 
electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to 
resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated.121 
 
Numerous commentators have embraced the independent state 
legislatures doctrine,122 while others have rejected it.123 Its longstanding 
 
118  See, e.g., In re Opinion of Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 601 (1864) (holding that, because a State 
legislature’s “authority . . . to prescribe the time, place and manner of holding elections for 
representatives in Congress,” is derived from the Elections Clause, “[t]he constitution and laws of this 
State are entirely foreign to the question”); Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 
691, 695 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944). Modern courts also occasionally apply the independent state legislature 
doctrine. See, e.g., PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 902 F. Supp. 2d 724, 747–48 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (noting that 
the Pennsylvania legislature’s authority to regulate the manner in which congressional and presidential 
elections are conducted stems from the U.S. Constitution and “is not circumscribed by the Pennsylvania 
Constitution”) [http://perma.cc/L9MF-JLU5]. 
119  D.W. BARTLETT, DIGEST OF ELECTION CASES, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 41-152, at 46–47 (1870). 
120  2 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 856 (1907); see also In re Holmes, 1 id. § 525. 
121  S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9 (1874). 
122  See, e.g., Walter Clark, The Electoral College and Presidential Suffrage, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 
741 (1917) (“[T]he exercise of such power [to regulate presidential elections] is given to the state 
legislature subject to no restriction from the state constitution.”) [http://perma.cc/4T2P-4LXL]; Richard 
D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811, 835 (2001) 
(“Suppose, then, that the state constitution forbade felons to vote. If the legislature, operating under the 
authority granted it by Article II rather than by the state constitution, decided that this limitation should 
not apply in voting for presidential electors, the legislative choice should prevail.”) 
[http://perma.cc/3YHA-66AY]; James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures over 
Presidential Elections, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 504 (1962) (“[S]tate legislatures are limited 
by constitutional provisions for veto, referendum, and initiative in prescribing the manner of choosing 
presidential electors, but . . . state constitutional provisions concerning suffrage qualifications and the 
manner of choosing electors do not limit the substantive terms of legislation.”) [http://perma.cc/98JQ-
PZP5]. 
123  See, e.g., Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 783–84 (2001) (arguing that the Founders did not construe the Presidential 
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history and acceptance by state and federal courts, as well as both houses of 
Congress, however, confirms the validity of an intratextual interpretation of 
the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The legislature, as 
referenced in those provisions, is the state’s general lawmaking body, and 
its power under the federal Constitution to regulate federal elections may 
not be reduced or withdrawn by state constitutions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because of the Constitution’s numerous references to state legislatures, 
an intratextual approach sheds compelling light on the term’s proper 
meaning in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. The text, 
context, drafting history, contemporaneous interpretations, and history of 
subsequent judicial interpretation of the numerous other constitutional 
provisions referring to legislatures collectively confirm that the term refers 
exclusively to the elected body of representatives within each state that 
exercises general lawmaking authority. Neither the Supreme Court nor 
academic commentators have provided a persuasive reason for concluding 
that, despite the consistent use of the term throughout most of the 
Constitution, it should be given a different and unusual construction solely 
for purposes of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause. 
 In particular, there is no basis for concluding that the word 
legislature as used in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause 
refers broadly to a state’s “lawmaking authority,” allowing a state’s voters 
to directly regulate federal elections through public initiatives or referenda. 
Likewise, because the Constitution specifically empowers the state 
legislature to regulate the “Time, Place and Manner” of federal elections, 
attempts to allow outside entities such as the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission to determine the boundaries of congressional 
districts violate the U.S. Constitution. 
 
Electors Clause as authorizing state legislatures to act independently of state constitutions) 
[http://perma.cc/F49X-QE9Z]; see also Richard H. Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 727–28 (2001) (accepting Smith’s conclusion that “as a matter of historical 
practice, state legislatures were not understood at the time to be more ‘independent’ by virtue of Article 
II of the constraints and conditions on their power than they were when acting pursuant to any other 
source of authority”) [http://perma.cc/DFZ9-77B9]; David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They 
Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 748 (2001) (“It is far from clear what the relationship is between a 
state’s constitution and the power that a state ‘legislature’ may exercise under Article II, Section 1 to 
‘direct’ the ‘manner’ in which electors are appointed.”) [http://perma.cc/L683-F53Q]. 
